COMMANDERS DIGEST

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SELECTED RESERVE:

Primary Augmentation Source for Active Forces

In Security Emergencies
The Nation Looks to the

SELECTED RESERVE

By
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As most of you are aware, the Selected Reserve units of the Reserve components presently comprise 30 per cent of the forces immediately available for national security emergencies. The Selected Reserve, together with the Individual Ready Reserve, provide nearly 50 per cent of the trained manpower available to the country upon mobilization. Guard and Reserve forces constitute about 50 per cent of today's Army division forces, including about 30 per cent of Army helicopter forces. We now have an objective for the Reserve components upon mobilization to furnish 50 per cent of the aircrews for the strategic airlift mission. And this year 56 per cent of our tactical airlift aircraft are assigned to the Air Guard and Air Force Reserve.

Thus, there can be no doubt that the Reserve components are, in fact, the primary source of augmentation for the active forces. There are two factors that serve to assure this, both today and in the future. First our Defense policy requires forces-in-being—forces



With Old Glory in the background a soldier stands watch on the Army Reserve training ship Resolve.



An Ohio Air National Guardsman operates the switchboard at Lowry Air Force Base. Below is William K. Brehm, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs). An Air Force KC-135 refuels an SR-71 aircraft. During FY 75, 128 KC-135s will be transferred to the Air National Guard, giving the ANG a new strategic offensive mission.



manned with people who are already trained. While the Selective Service machinery must be kept in good working order as a hedge against the possible need for general mobilization, the Selective Service System cannot deliver and the Armed Services cannot train new personnel in much less than five months. A major war in Europe could be over by then.

Second, today's manpower economics require that a portion of our forces-in-being be on Reserve status. Manpower costs now consume more than 55 per cent of the Defense budget. Moreover, a high rate of inflation may be a phenomenon that we are going to have to cope with for sometime. We must get the most for our manpower dollar, and greater dependence on the Reserve components is a way to help us do that. We cannot afford, in our judgment, to reduce overall force levels. Such reductions inevitably would impact on our conventional forces, since they are the largest consumers of manpower. Yet a condition of nuclear parity with the Soviet Union has made it all the more necessary to maintain a strong conventional capability to keep the nuclear threshold as high as possible. And the situation is further exacerbated by the fact that Soviet military forces have grown by more than a million men during the past decade.

We must of course pursue all opportunities to improve manpower utilization and maximize effectiveness. For example, we must have quality equipment that multiplies the effectiveness of our military personnel, and it must be available at a cost we can afford so that we procure sufficient quantities to plug any gaps in our materiel readiness. That's a major challenge for the research and development (R&D) community. Also, we must eliminate all marginal billets in our command and management superstructure and convert those spaces to effective combat strength.

To meet the equipment challenge, we are moving in the direction of the hi-low mix, a concept that provides, first, a moderate amount of the most advanced equipment we can design and produce, and second, sufficient quantities of less-sophisticated equipment to ensure that all of our forces are properly equipped. A good example of this concept, of course, is found in our Air Force programs where we have developed the F-15 to meet the most advanced threat and now are bringing along the new air combat fighter to meet our quantity needs. The concept can be applied to our land and naval forces as well.

And what about the elimination of marginal headquarters functions? Our principal initiative in this area has been the headquarters review initiated by the Secretary of Defense last October. In decisions to date, we have thus far through consolidation and streamlining been able to identify a total of 22,400 headquarters and headquarters support spaces which

Oregon Army National Guard SSgt. Joe Beech shaves in 34 degree water during his unit's annual training at Fort Greely, Alaska. Indiana Army National Guardsmen practice a river assault exercise during annual training.

are now being converted to increase our combat forces and readiness. The Army's share of these savings represents a major factor in permitting the active Army to build toward 16 active divisions, three more than they have today. Similarly, in the past year alone, the Air Force has converted sufficient headquarters and support manpower to more than man a C-130 tactical airlift wing. The Services have built up real momentum in their streamlining efforts, a fact that reflects the thoughtful and spirited leadership of men like the late Army Chief of Staff, General Creighton Abrams, a man we all miss both personally and professionally—a man who set a tremendous example.

But now let's come back to the Reserve components. What do we mean when we talk about placing greater reliance on the Reserves to achieve greater Defense capability for the dollar? Well, to me it means four things:

Giving them valid missions;

Giving them modern equipment;

Providing better, more meaningful training; and

Assurance that the Reserves will actually be called upon if needed.

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What, specifically, are we doing in these four areas?

First, let me talk about missions. As the active Army builds to its new level of 16 active divisions, it will have three divisions with only two brigades each instead of the normal complement of three. The National Guard will provide three separate brigades which will be affiliated with those divisions during peacetime, and which will become an organic part of those divisions — will deploy and fight with them — upon mobilization.

In addition to those three brigades, another 22 Reserve component separate-maneuver-battalions will affiliate with active divisions which do not have a full complement of battalions in their active structure, and they too will become organic parts of the active divisions upon mobilization.

Altogether, these round-out units total 30 battalions. This represents 25 per cent of the combat power of 11 active Army divisions in the affiliation program—maneuver capability which they definitely would need to be fully effective in combat.

But that's not all there is to the affiliation program; another seven separate brigades with 21 battalions will affiliate with active divisions to acquire training support. The concept is that upon mobilization these brigades would also deploy with the active divisions, and would operate, at least in initial combat, as "fourth" brigades, if you will; a concept that is entirely compatible with the organizational flexibility of the modern Army division.

The affiliation program for our land forces, involving 51 maneuver battalions and some artillery battalions, is for real; it is not just a paper shuffle. I recently had the opportunity to see for myself both at Fort Hood, Texas, and Fort Knox, Kentucky, how the active forces are supporting the affiliated Reserve units during summer training—supporting them with equipment and with manpower. The concept is working. Sure we're still in the learning stage. But the affiliation concept is real because it *has* to be real.

Now to turn to equipment. This is perhaps the most difficult issue to come to grips with, and it is one that is getting a great deal of attention in the Total Force Study we are presently conducting. Equipment procurement has a long lead time, and production lines often have capacity limitations. In the early 1960s we finally started to buy equipment for the Reserve components; but by the time it was delivered, it was needed to equip new active units being formed and deployed to Southeast Asia. Eventually, as the active forces phased down, much of that equipment did get to the Reserves, but the dry spell was long, and we still have not met all of our needs for modernization. While some of these problems will take years to solve, we must have solutions with annual milestones worked out in detail.

There is, however, one equipment-related issue that I can address specifically, and it falls within the category of "the good news." For that matter, it is also a mission issue. The Secretary of Defense has authorized me to announce that the Defense Department is planning to transfer, beginning in Fiscal Year 1976, 128 KC-135 jet tanker aircraft from the active Air Force to the Reserve Forces. Most of these will go to the Air National Guard. The transfer, which will take place over a period of several years, will permit the phasing out of obsolescent KC-97 aircraft. It will also assist in the phase-out of other older aircraft types, as we maintain our 91 Air Guard flying units. And since the KC–135 tankers will support SAC,

this will, for the first time, place the Air National Guard squarely in the strategic offensive mission. The Air Force is now working out the detailed basing plans for the KC-135 transfer, and we will be keeping the Congress fully informed as we proceed. It is hard for me to imagine a more persuasive example of our desire to achieve maximum utilization of the Reserve components.

The third factor involved in making the concept of greater reliance on the Reserves a viable one is that of providing meaningful training. Many of our training problems, where they do exist, can be solved through providing better equipment. But there is much more to it than that, and I think this is particularly true for our land forces. Our Total Force Study has made it clear that we cannot guarantee meaningful training merely through establishing new policies. In the final analysis, it falls to the unit commanders to do that.

And the time has come to deal with this issue in a forthright manner. We must have imaginative leadership across the board. That means tailoring training programs to fit the unique needs of each unit. We need not be bound by traditional patterns. How many times does a man have to practice changing a tire on a deuce-and-a-half, or opening a valve in a fuel-transfer unit? How many hours of dry lecture does he need on first aid?

The men and women volunteering for service in the Reserve components today are there because they want to be; they are not running from the draft. We have an obligation to them, and to the Reserve mission, to design training programs that are challenging and useful. Imagination and hard work are key ingredients. I cannot overemphasize how important it is that every unit commander approach the problem from his point of view and make maximum use of every training minute. Only then can the Reserves achieve their full potential. Only then will all of our young Guardsmen and Reservists be proud of what they are doing and invite their friends to join up. When Mr. Will Hill Tankersley, the President's nominee for the position of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, comes on board, this issue will receive his highest priority attention. He and I have had a number of discussions on the matter, and it is very clear to me that he understands the problem fully and will, if confirmed by the Senate, pursue it—with vigor.

Finally, we come to the matter of whether the Reserve components will be called if needed. The degree of force interdependence we are

A direct air support control vehicle is loaded aboard an Air Force Reserve C-130 aircraft during a special training exercise involving both Reservists and Guardsmen.

Navy Reserve Officer Training Corps Cadet Veronica Fininen receives instruction on ship's handling aboard the USS Meredith. She was one of 14 NROTC women who visited the ship at its homeport at Naval Station, Mayport, Florida.

creating as we integrate the Army National Guard with the active Army and as we increase our dependence on the Air Guard for strategic and tactical airlift, tactical air, and now for strategic offense, means that we must change the perception of those who believe that the Reserves will be mobilized only if there is a World War II type of contingency.

The Reserves must never be called up capriciously. But they must be available for a variety of circumstances, else the concepts of "strengthening of the Reserves" and "greater reliance on the Reserves" have no meaning. This is perhaps the most basic reservation expressed by active duty military personnel whenever discussions of transferring meaningful missions to the Guard or Reserve arise. And it is an understandable mind-set, considering historical trends. If the active forces don't believe that the Guard and Reserve will be available to them in time of need, it is unlikely that they will enthusiastically support such transfers.

As a result of our hearings with the Senate Armed Services Committee concerning this matter, we are preparing proposed legislation that would authorize the President or the Secretary of Defense to mobilize Reserve units involving up to 50,000 members of the Selected Reserve at any one time for up to 90 days without prior approval or declaration of a national emergency.

We clearly recognize that such authority, if granted, must be used judiciously and that to do otherwise could have an adverse impact on Guard and Reserve retention and recruiting. We are also very aware that volunteers from the Guard and Reserve have in the past provided excellent support to the active forces during times of crisis—without mobilization. This would continue to be our preferred source of manpower for smaller emergencies whenever and wherever possible. But there can be instances when we will need selected units of the Guard and Reserve quickly to protect the national interest. The proposed legislation will give us the capability to fill this need under most, if not all, circumstances and will provide the assurance needed to offset concerns with respect to non-availability of the Reserves. I believe that the mere knowledge that such a proposal is in the works has already had a positive effect on the active forces. What it comes down to, really, is credibility. And that credibility must extend across the oceans to our allies and potential adversaries alike or else a major part of the deterrent value of our military forces could be lost, and that would be tragic indeed.

These are my thoughts about the role of the Reserve components in the serious business of national security. I have tried to be specific where I could, and to avoid glittering generalities because they neither solve our problems nor accurately portray our progress.

I think it is quite apparent that we are relying on the National Guard to assume an expanding role in our national defense posture. If our Total Force—active and reserve—has the clear capacity to deploy rapidly in a crisis situation, we both reduce the chance of our forces being needed, and assure ourselves of a better outcome if they are. That, of course, is what it's all about.

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